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Interpretation as conflict resolution 
Henriëtte de Swart and Joost Zwarts 
 
 
0. Background and motivation 
 
Semantic interpretation is not a simple process. When we want to know what a given 
sentence means, more is needed than just a simple ‘adding up’ of the meanings of the 
component words. Not only can the words in a sentence interact and conflict with each 
other, but also with the linguistic and non-linguistic context in which the sentence was 
uttered. Deictic, anaphoric, and elliptical expressions attune their interpretation to the 
properties of the context, noun phrases have to be shifted in type to fit a particular 
argument slot (Partee 1987), and lexical meanings may need to undergo coercion to 
match the neighboring words (Pustejovsky 1995). Optimality-theory provides a 
framework to deal with such conflicts in interpretation in a systematic way by means of 
constraint-ranking (Prince and Smolensky 1993). In 2002, NWO, the Dutch Organization 
for Scientific Research, funded a project proposal submitted by Petra Hendriks 
(Groningen University), Helen de Hoop (University of Nijmegen) and the first author of 
this paper (Utrecht University) as part of the Cognition Program.1 The starting point of 
the project is the notion of conflicts in interpretation and their resolution by constraint-
ranking. This paper reports on the first results, and sketches the lines of research opening 
up in this project. We illustrate with four examples: anaphora resolution, the polysemy of 
the spatial preposition round, negative concord and the acquisition of indefinites. 
 
1. Optimality Theoretic Semantics 
 
Optimality Theory (OT) is a linguistic meta-theory that arose out of ideas in 
connectionist theory, or parallel distributed processing, a view on cognition that emerged 
in the 1980s (cf. Rumelhart et al. 1986). It had been applied to phonology and syntax, 
before it was first explored as a framework for semantics by Blutner (2000), Hendriks 
and de Hoop (2001), Zeevat (2000), and de Hoop and de Swart (2000). Smolensky 
(1996) first identified the connectionist notion of well-formedness in terms of harmony of 
an activation pattern with the linguistic notion of well-formedness. The connectionist 
notion of harmony depends on the connections in the network, which create a relation 
between an input and an output. In OT syntax, the input consists of a meaning, and the 
output of a form. In OT semantics, the input is a form (utterance), and the output is a 
meaning. OT syntax is speaker oriented: the speaker who wants to get a certain message 
across, wants to use the optimal form to express this meaning. OT semantics is hearer 
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oriented: an utterance needs to be understood by the hearer. For any given utterance 
(form), a number of meaningful candidates need to be evaluated in order to determine the 
optimal meaning. The decision is determined by a set of constraints, which are ranked in 
a particular order. The constraints are soft, that is, they can all be violated. The ranking 
determines the strength of the constraint, and the violation of a lower ranked constraint is 
often motivated by the need to satisfy a higher ranked constraint. The constraints are 
evaluated in parallel, so we can consider different aspects of meaning (e.g. from different 
modules of the grammar) at the same time. The optimal interpretation that emerges 
eliminates all other candidates, that is, the winner takes all. This approach to the study of 
meaning has opened up new lines of thinking about the relation between the lexicon, 
syntactic structure, intonation, and discourse structure. We illustrate this with the 
example of anaphora resolution. 
 
2. Anaphora resolution in OT 
 
Hendriks and de Hoop (2001) are concerned with the interpretation of elliptical sentences 
such as (1a) and (1b): 
 
(1) a. Who wants the first one? 
 b. Most were rejected. 
 
In order to obtain the intended interpretation for quantified, but incomplete or anaphoric 
expressions, a compositional interpretation based on syntactic structure alone is not 
possible. We need to take into account lexical knowledge and contextual interpretation.  
Hendriks and de Hoop argue that the parallel application of soft constraints from different 
domains (contextual, intonational, syntactic...) derives the optimal interpretation.  
 One very general pragmatic constraint captures the fact that there is a general 
preference to interpret elements as anaphors, related to the previous discourse. This is 
formulated as DOAP (cf. Williams 1997): 
 
(2) DOAP: don’t overlook anaphoric possibilities. 
 Opportunities to anaphorize text must be seized. 
 
DOAP is a soft constraint, and can be overruled by other constraints. For instance, the 
syntactic constraint known as PRINCIPLE B is obviously stronger than DOAP: 
 
(3) PRINCIPLE B: If two arguments of the same semantic relation are not marked as  
being identical, interpret them as being distinct. 
 
If we rank PRINCIPLE B higher than DOAP (PRINCB >> DOAP), we can account for the 
contrast between (4a) and (4b) in terms of different optimal interpretations. 
 
(4) a. Often when I talk to a doctor, the doctor disagrees with him. 
b. Often when I talk to a doctor, the doctor disagrees with himself. 
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Interpreting himself in (4b) as anaphoric to the doctor satisfies both DOAP and 
PRINCIPLE B. However, the same anaphoric interpretation for him in (4a) would violate 
PRINCIPLE B. Given that PRINCIPLE B is ranked higher than DOAP, and that we 
generally prefer a violation of the weaker constraint (DOAP) over the stronger constraint 
(PRINCIPLE B), the non-anaphoric reading emerges as the optimal interpretation. This is 
reflected in the following tableaux: 
 
Tableau 1: reflexive himself (4b) 
 
Form Meaning PRINCB DOAP 
A doctor1 the doctor1 himself1    
A doctor1 the doctor2 himself1     *! 
A doctor1 the doctor1 himself2     *! 
A doctor1 the doctor2 himself2     *! 
Often when I talk        
to a doctor, the  
doctor disagrees  
with himself 
A doctor1 the doctor2 himself3     *!* 
 
 
Tableau 2: pronominal him(4a) 
 
Form Meaning PRINCB DOAP 
A doctor1 the doctor1 him1      *!  
A doctor1 the doctor2 him1     * 
A doctor1 the doctor1 him2     * 
A doctor1 the doctor2 him2     *!    * 
Often when I talk  
to a doctor, the               
doctor disagrees              
with him 
A doctor1 the doctor2 him3     **! 
 
 
Each tableau gives a partial represention of the given input (the form), the set of potential 
outputs (meanings), and the relevant constraints (PRINCIPLE B and DOAP). The strength 
of the constraints is reflected in the left-right order, so PRINCIPLE B outranks DOAP 
(PRINCB >> DOAP). The indices on the NPs indicate the possible interpretations of the 
sentence. A fully anaphoric interpretation bears the same index for a doctor, the doctor, 
and the anaphoric expression him or himself. Obviously, a fully anaphoric interpretation 
incurs no violation of DOAP. All candidates besides the first one violate DOAP to a 
greater or a lesser extent. This is indicated with an asterisk (*). Note that the three middle 
candidates each incur one violation of DOAP, whereas the last candidate in each tableau 
incurs two violations of DOAP. This reflects the observation that, as far as DOAP is 
concerned, a partly anaphoric interpretation is to be preferred over no anaphoric 
interpretation at all. The best candidate in tableau 1 is the candidate that does not violate 
either PRINCIPLE B or DOAP, that is, the fully anaphoric meaning. The optimal 
candidate is marked as optimal (). The exclamation marks (!) added to the asterisks in 
the column for DOAP indicate that the violation is fatal, and imply that the candidate is 
suboptimal. Tableau 2 indicates that violations cannot always be avoided, because the 
constraints are potentially conflicting. The fact that the second and the third candidate are 
preferred over the first interpretation confirms that PRINCIPLE B is indeed stronger than 
DOAP. However, we do not accept more violations than necessary, so the last candidate 
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is dispreferred. Note that the same violations which result in the optimal candidates in 
tableau 2 were marked as fatal in tableau 1. This indicates that no violation is fatal in 
itself, but the tableau as a whole determines which candidate emerges as optimal. This 
illustrates the notion of parallel evaluation of constraints. 
 Obviously, the observation that anaphoric interpretations are preferred does not 
always answer the question of the antecedent of an anaphoric expression. Especially in 
the context of a discourse, more than one linguistic antecedent might be available, and 
other principles come into play to determine which one is the appropriate antecedent. 
Bouma (2003), Hendriks (2004), de Hoop (2001, 2003), and ongoing research by Gerlof 
Bouma and Petra Hendriks shows that properties ranging from morphological 
information (gender: he/she, number: he/they, case: he/him), syntactic structure 
(subject/object asymmetries, coordination versus subordination), intonation (stress) and 
discourse structure (distance, topichood) come into play in the process of anaphora 
resolution. Given the notion of parallel evaluation, it is possible to let all these principles 
interact in an OT interpretation procedure. This leads to a cross-modular view of 
semantics. 
 Following standard ideas about the relation between form and meaning, it might 
be thought that syntactic principles are generally stronger than pragmatic principles, and 
that contextual information comes in as a last resort. For instance, PRINCIPLE B is ranked 
higher than DOAP in tableaux 1 and 2. If such a view were correct, this would weaken 
the necessity for a cross-modular approach to semantics. However, it can be shown that 
syntax does not always win. Consider the contrast between examples (5a) and (5b) (from 
Hendriks and de Hoop 2001): 
 
(5) a. Ten students attended the meeting. Three spoke. 
b. Ten students attended the meeting. Twelve spoke. 
 
In (5a), the preferred domain of quantification for the determiner three in the second 
sentence is the set of students that attended the meeting. This is the intersection of the 
two argument sets of the first determiner. When we look at the formal properties of 
determiner denotations, this cannot be a coincidence. Natural language determiners are 
typically conservative or left-leaning: 
 
(6) Conservativity: Det(A,B) ↔ Det(A,A∩B). 
 
Conservativity is rooted in syntactic structure: the set A is typically provided by the N’ 
that forms a constituent with the determiner. That is, in order to determine the truth value 
of a quantificational statement, we only need to be concerned with the set that the noun 
refers to (A), and the intersection of the sets denoted by the noun and the predicate 
(A∩B). If we then take A∩B to be the domain of quantification of the next determiner, 
we satisfy DOAP, by means of a natural case of topic reduction. This can be captured in 
terms of a constraint of FORWARD DIRECTIONALITY (Van Kuppevelt 1996): 
 
(7) FORWARD DIRECTIONALITY: The topic range induced by the domain of 
quantification of a determiner (set A) is reduced to the topic range induced by the 
intersection of the two argument sets of this determiner (A∩B). 
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Although FORWARD DIRECTIONALITY is well motivated by the syntax of 
quantificational structures, and the property of conservativity of natural language 
determiners, it is overruled in examples like (5b). It is easy to see that an interpretation in 
terms of forward directionality would lead to an inconsistent interpretation of (5b), 
because twelve cannot take as its domain of quantification a set that contains only ten 
individuals. This shows that the constraint which Hendriks and de Hoop label as AVOID 
CONTRADICTION is ranked higher than FORWARD DIRECTIONALITY: 
 
(8) AVOID CONTRADICTION >> FORWARD DIRECTIONALITY 
 
Although AVOID CONTRADICTION is a very general pragmatic constraint, it is ranked 
very high. Note that (5b) favors an interpretation in which twelve quantifies over students 
(even though it doesn’t quantify over students who attended the meeting). This indicates 
that DOAP is respected. 
 Given the emphasis we placed on cross-modularity, it might be thought that OT 
approaches lend themselves very well for questions of meaning that involve the 
interaction of semantic and pragmatic aspects of interpretation, but are less suitable for 
hardcore semantic questions. This would leave OT analyses at the edge of the field of 
semantics. In order to avoid such a misunderstanding, we discuss an example from 
lexical semantics in which the notion of conflicts in interpretation plays a central role. 
Section 3 treats the issue of polysemy in spatial prepositions from an OT perspective.  
3. Polysemy and context 
 
In his well-known treatment of over, Lakoff (1987) shows that polysemous spatial 
prepositions involve networks of related meanings. The examples in (9) illustrate this for 
the meanings of round (cf. Hawkins 1984, Schulze 1991, 1993, Taylor 1995, 
Lindstromberg 1998): 
 
(9) a. The postman ran round the block. 
b. The burglar drove round the barrier. 
c. The steeplechaser ran round the corner. 
d. The captain sailed round the lake 
e. The tourist drove round the city center. 
 
a b c d e
 
Figure 1: Different paths for round 
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Round describes a full circle in (9a, d), but only a half circle in (9b), and a quarter-circle 
in (9c). The block defines the central point of the circle in (9a), but the lake provides the 
outer border of the circle in (9d). In (9e) the city center provides the outer border, and the 
driving involves a criss-cross movement, rather than a circular one. The question arises 
how the context-dependent meaning of round illustrated in (9) can be accounted for in a 
theory that respects the principle of compositionality of meaning. The principle of 
compositionality of meaning says that the meaning of a complex whole is built up of the 
meaning of its parts and the way they are put together. Zwarts (2003a) argues that the 
interpretation of round in any given context requires the interaction of lexical semantics 
(involving prototypes in cognitive grammar), model-theoretic semantics (vector space 
semantics, Zwarts and Winter 2000), and pragmatics (world knowledge). Consequently, 
we need a cross-modular approach in which we can assign weights to the semantic 
contribution of different parts, and determine the optimal meaning by the interaction of 
semantic and pragmatic constraints. There are different ways we can go about this kind of 
problem. We can choose an underspecification account, and fill in the contextual 
properties of the core meaning as we go along (cf. Blutner 1998, 2000), or we can start 
with the strongest, prototypical meaning, and weaken it as necessary in the context. 
Zwarts (2003a) adopts the second line of explanation. 
Zwarts suggests that we can organize the conceptual structure referred to by 
cognitive linguistics into formal semantics by showing that the meanings of a spatial 
preposition like round involve a cluster of properties that can be described in terms of 
vector space semantics. He takes the core or prototypical meaning of round to correspond 
to a circle, a circular shape (in two- or three-dimensional space) or a circular movement 
(9a). This prototypical meaning is modeled in terms of a path, that is, a sequence of 
vectors located with their starting point in one common origin. The origin is determined 
by the reference object of the preposition (9a-c), a central point in that reference object 
(9d), or by an implicitly given reference point. A path is not only used to represent 
motion, as in (9), but also extension and rotation, as in (10a,b): 
 
(10) a. Mary has a necklace round her neck. 
b. John turned the wine glass round in his fingers. 
 
A prototypical round path has a vector pointing in every direction in a plane, that is, a 
two-dimensional vector space. This is called COMPLETENESS. Not all complete paths are 
circles. Spirals and ellipses are complete, but they are not circles. What distinguishes 
circular paths from spiraling and elliptical paths is that all the vectors of a circular path 
are of the same length. This is called CONSTANCY. Figure 2 illustrates that only perfectly 
circular paths have both COMPLETENESS and CONSTANCY: 
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+Completeness 
+Constancy 
+Completeness 
−Constancy 
−Completeness 
+Constancy 
−Completeness 
−Constancy 
 
Figure 2: Round and less round 
 
Round shares certain parts of its meaning with other directional prepositions. One of 
those properties is UNIQUENESS, the property that a round path describes a circle in the 
most economical way, without passing any direction twice.  
 The strongest, prototypical meaning of round (9a) can be described by a 
conjunction of properties, including UNIQUENESS, CONSTANCY and COMPLETENESS. The 
weaker, non-prototypical meanings of (9b-e) are characterized by a conjunction of less or 
weaker properties. For instance, the weakening of CONSTANCY allows the path in (11a) to 
be elliptical. A violation of UNIQUENESS is found in (11b): 
 
(11) a. The earth goes round the sun. 
b. The mouse keeps running round the computer. 
c. The bridge is damaged, so you will have to go round by the lower one. 
 
Weaker versions of COMPLETENESS are INVERSION, which requires there to be two 
vectors pointing in opposite directions (at least a half-circle), and ORTHOGONALITY, 
which requires there to be two vectors pointing in perpendicular directions (at least a 
quarter-circle).  INVERSION is the appropriate meaning of round in the context of (9b), 
ORTHOGONALITY emerges in (9c). We find an even weaker meaning in (11c), where 
round gets the meaning of DETOUR, that is, a (slightly) longer path than a straight line. 
If we can weaken the properties making up the prototypical meaning of round, 
how do we know which interpretation emerges in a particular context? Zwarts (2003a) 
extends the Strongest Meaning Hypothesis proposed by Dalrymple et al. (1994) to 
account for non-prototypical meanings of round. The strategy is to prefer the strongest 
meaning of round that is compatible with the context in which it is used. In OT terms, 
this is captured by means of a combination of two constraints, namely STRENGTH and 
FIT. The constraint STRENGTH prefers stronger over weaker interpretations (compare 
Blutner 2000, Zeevat 2000). The constraint FIT favors interpretations that do not give rise 
to a contradictory or unnatural reading (compare Zeevat 2000 for a similar consistency 
constraint). It can be seen as a more general version of the constraint AVOID 
CONTRADICTION mentioned in section 2 above. FIT is ranked over STRENGTH (written 
FIT >> STRENGTH), which means that a weaker non-contradictory meaning wins over a 
stronger constradictory meaning. This is illustrated with the following tableau for the 
interpretation of round the door: 
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Tableau 3: The interpretation of round the door 
 
Form  Meaning FIT STRENGTH 
 COMPLETENESS *!  
 INVERSION  * 
 ORTHOGONALITY  **! 
 
round the door 
 DETOUR  **!* 
 
The four possible interpretations of round the door are visualized in figure 3: 
 
 
COMPLETENESS INVERSION ORTHOGONALITY DETOUR 
 
Figure 3: Four possible interpretations of round the door 
 
The strongest interpretation, in which round describes a fully circular path, is excluded 
because of the conflict in interpretation between this strong, prototypical meaning of 
round and the lexical semantics of door. Doors are not objects that one can normally get 
fully around upon entering a room. So the COMPLETENESS interpretation of round is 
weakened to make it fit the context, and the INVERSION reading emerges as the optimal 
interpretation. Weaker readings involving ORTHOGONALITY or DETOUR are less optimal, 
because they incur more violations of STRENGTH (COMPLETENESS being more and more 
weakened). This can change if more linguistic context is taken into account, as in the 
sentence ‘A man put his head round the door’. Now the type of path that we choose for 
round also has to fit information about the kind of object that moves or extends along the 
path, a head in this example. Usually, if someone puts his head round the door, he will 
remain standing on one side of it. The length and flexibility of human necks do not allow 
him to move his head all the way to the other side of the door. He will just be able to put 
his head to the side of the door so that he can see what is outside, or speak with someone 
standing outside. Taking this pragmatic knowledge into account, we determine that 
ORTHOGONALITY is the strongest interpretation still fitting the sentence meaning as a 
whole, because INVERSION violates FIT in this context. Interpretation in context, 
involving everything from lexical semantics and vector space semantics to knowledge of 
the world is thus crucial to determine the optimal meaning of a form, and thereby resolve 
the polysemy in ways similar to the way in which we resolved anaphora in section 1 
above.  
The constraints we have discussed so far are typically very general, possibly even 
universal, as usual in OT. OT approaches to natural language usually maintain that the 
constraints are general, but the ranking is specific to the language at hand. Changes in the 
constraint ranking of phonological and syntactic principles have been used to explain 
typological differences between languages (Prince and Smolensky 1993, Grimshaw and 
Samek-Lodovici 1998), and have been shown to play a role in diachronic development as 
well (Jäger 2002, Zeevat and Jäger 2002, Rosenbach 2002, Kusters 2003 among others). 
However, with respect to the examples discussed in this section, reranking of constraints 
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does not seem very obvious. It is intuitively not very likely that we will find a language in 
which, say, FORWARD DIRECTIONALITY is ranked higher than AVOID CONTRADICTION, 
and patterns of anaphora resolution are changed accordingly. On the other hand, the idea 
that meaning can vary from one language to the next, and that we need to study semantics 
from a cross-linguistic point of view has been emerging in the literature (Bach et al. 
1995, Chierchia 1998 among others). Following that line of study, Zwarts (2003b) 
compares the expression of ‘round’ in English and Dutch in a diachronic perspective. 
However, it is difficult to study these issues from a more general typological perspective. 
It is easier to study reranking of semantic constraints at the structural level. We will show 
in section 5 below how changes in ranking can account for variation in the marking and 
interpretation of negation across languages. But in order to be able to address that issue, 
we need to say a few words about compositionality and bi-directional optimization first.  
 
4. Compositionality and bi-directional optimization 
 
Compositionality was at issue in the context-dependent meaning of round, because we 
need a systematic way to interpret the complex utterance on the basis of the constituting 
parts and the way they are put together. Compositionality also plays a role in anaphora 
resolution. Consider the contrast between (12a) and (12b): 
 
(12) a. Most ships unload at night. 
b. Most people sleep at night. 
 
Although the two sentences have exactly the same syntactic structure, the preferred 
interpretation of the quantificational structure is not the same. The dominant 
interpretation of (12a) is one in which most ships that need to unload do so at night. The 
preferred interpretation of (12b) says that what most people do at night is to sleep. These 
meanings are brought out by different stress patterns: 
 
(13) a Most ships unload AT NIGHT. 
 b. Most people SLEEP at night. 
 
According to Generalized Quantifier theory (Barwise and Cooper 1981), a determiner 
such as most establishes a relation between two sets of individuals. This complex 
meaning should be the result of the meaning of the parts and the way they are put 
together, under the assumption of compositionality of meaning. This implies that we 
should look at syntactic structure for help in determining which way the constituting parts 
are put together. The determiner (D) forms a constituent with the noun (N’), called NP 
(or DP, depending on your preferred syntactic assumptions). Thus it is natural to assume, 
as Barwise and Cooper do, that N’ provides the first argument of the quantifier, and the 
VP the second argument. However, quantification in (12) is not just about ships or about 
people, it is about ships that unload and what people do at night. Stress and contextual 
information play an important role in determining the full argument structure of a 
quantifier (Partee 1991, 1995), as illustrated by (13a, b).  
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However, as Blutner et al. (2003) point out, it is not so obvious how to formalize 
the influence of context and lexical knowledge on the truth-conditions of quantificational 
structures, because the different factors may be in conflict with each other: syntactically 
optimal interpretations may be pragmatically unlikely. According to Blutner et al. (2003), 
there are different ways of solving the tension between form and meaning in these kinds 
of examples. One solution might be to do away with the principle of compositionality of 
meaning altogether. Another solution would be to relate compositionality to the notion of 
recoverability. Recoverability is usually assumed as a meta-restriction on syntactic 
analyses. It requires the semantic content of elements that are not pronounced to be 
recoverable from local context (Pesetsky 1998, Kuhn 2001, Buchwald et al. 2002). If 
recoverability and compositionality are in fact two sides of the same coin, we need to 
view compositionality problems in the light of bi-directional optimization. In bi-
directional OT, the speaker’s and the hearer’s perspective are taken into account 
simultaneously, and we evaluate pairs of forms and meanings. Bi-directional OT 
guarantees a general procedure of optimization from form to meaning and from meaning 
to form such that a speaker’s optimal expression of a meaning and a hearer’s optimal 
interpretation of a form depend on each other in each context in a well-defined way. We 
will illustrate this general idea with the marking and interpretation of negation in natural 
language.  
 
5. Negation in bi-directional OT 
 
The fact that bi-directional optimization and compositionality hang together is illustrated 
by another set of observations, this time within the realm of negation. Natural languages 
generally have expressions for negation and denial, so something that expresses the 
connective ¬. They also frequently have ways to refer to the negative quantifier ¬∃x. In 
English, these would be the negation marker not and the negative indefinite pronouns 
nothing/nobody. In Italian these would be non and niente/nadie. In Portuguese, these 
would be não and ninguém/nada. If we assume that knowledge of something like first-
order logic, or something equivalent to first-order logic is part of general human 
cognition, we might predict that negation and negative quantifiers behave the same across 
languages. From empirical research by typologists and theoretical linguists, we know that 
this is not the case (cf. Jespersen 1917, 1933, Dahl 1979, Payne 1985, Horn 1989, 
Ladusaw 1991, 1996, Bernini and Ramat 1996, and Haspelmath 1997 for overviews of 
the empirical facts). In particular, we know that in many cases, nothing, niente, nada, … 
behave alike as negative answers to a question. This is illustrated by the following ad 
from Dixons, a company that sells cell phones, which appeared in the Dutch papers in the 
summer of 2003: 
 
(14) Quanta Costa?  Niets, nada, niente. 
 Dixons heeft de zomer in zijn bol. En in zijn winkels. Met drie top-telefoontjes  
voor niets, noppes, nada, niente. En dat is niet verkeerd, zo vlak voor de vakantie. 
 Quanta Costa? Nothing, nada, niente. 
 Dixons has summer on the brain. And in its stores. With three top of the line  
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phones for nothing, zip, nada, niente. And that’s not a bad idea, right before the 
summer vacation. 
  
The italicized bits in the translation illustrate the parts where the Dutch ad uses 
Spanish/Portuguese/Italian bits of phrases. Noppes is a synonym of niets (just somewhat 
more informal in register, and somewhat more emphatic in meaning). The point of the 
repetition of words meaning ‘nothing’ in Dutch and other languages is obviously 
emphatic: these phones cost nothing at all, they are totally free (in combination with a 
paid subscription to a particular phone company, of course, but that is in the small print 
not spelled out here). The point of the example in this paper is that the words, in isolation, 
mean the same thing. That is, at the lexical level we cannot establish a distinction 
between the negative indefinite pronouns niets, noppes, nothing, nada, niente. As a stand 
alone response to a question as in (14), they all mean ‘nothing’. However, most linguists 
are aware of the fact that differences do arise when we combine more than one of these 
expressions in the context of a (single clause) sentence, as witnessed by the following 
examples: 
 
(15) a. Nobody said nothing.   English ¬∃x¬∃y Say(x,y) 
 b. Niemand zei niets.   Dutch  ¬∃x¬∃y Say(x,y) 
 c. Nadie a miraba a nadie.  Spanish ¬∃x∃y See(x,y) 
 d. Nessuno ha parlata con nessuno Italian  ¬∃x∃y Say(x,y) 
f. Ninguém disse nada.    Portuguese ¬∃x∃y Say(x,y) 
 
The first two languages (English, Dutch) exemplify the phenomenon of double negation, 
that is, the combination of two negations leads to the expression of double negation. The 
last three languages exemplify the phenomenon of so-called ‘negative concord’, that is, 
the combination of two – or more – negations leads to the expression of single negation. 
In order to express the single negation reading of sentences (15c-e), languages like 
English and Dutch use indefinite pronouns (iets in 16b) or negative polarity items 
(anything in 16a) for the argument embedded under negation: 
 
(16) a. Nobody said anything.  English  ¬∃x∃y Say(x,y) 
 b. Niemand zei iets.   Dutch  ¬∃x∃y Say(x,y) 
 
Expressions that participate in negative concord are called ‘n-words’ (see Corblin et al. 
2004 and references therein). De Swart (2004) uses the term ‘neg expressions’ to 
generalize over negative quantifiers like English nobody, nothing, and n-words like 
Spanish nadie, Italian nessuno, Portuguese ninguém, and distinguish them from indefinite 
pronouns like Dutch iets ‘something’, and polarity items like English anything.  
Negative concord is widespread across the languages of the world (Ladusaw 
1996, Haspelmath 1997). Even though it might be the typological default, it is a curious 
phenomenon from a semantic perspective, because it raises serious problems for the 
principle of compositionality. The laws of negation from first-order logic predict that the 
combination of two negations leads to a double negation reading as in (15a, b). So how 
can we explain the fact that n-words express negation in isolation, but that a sequence of 
n-words does not lead to multiple negation readings? The strategy here as before in this 
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paper should be that interpretation needs to take place in context. That is, the observation 
that negative quantifiers and n-words behave the same way in isolation, but not in the 
context of a sequence needs to be taken seriously. We will explain this fact here as the 
result of the distribution of labor between syntax and semantics in a language.  
The basic intuitions are the following. Negative concord languages like Romance 
mark the arguments embedded under negation formally as negative (by means of n-
words), but make sure that each neg expression does not necessarily contribute a 
semantic negation (so a sequence of n-words expresses a single negation, cf. 15c-e). 
Double negation languages like the Germanic languages necessarily interpret all neg 
expressions as contributing a negation (so two negative quantifiers lead to double 
negation, cf 15a,b), but make sure that arguments embedded under negation are not 
formally marked as negative (so use indefinite pronouns or negative polarity items rather 
than neg expressions, cf. 16a, b). The fact that double negation and negative concord 
languages rely on a different balance between formal marking and semantic 
interpretation, and each system has to make sacrifices to achieve this balance suggests 
that a bi-directional OT analysis (relating meaning to form, and form to meaning) is the 
most appropriate approach to address these issues. 
 The starting point of the analysis is the observation that negation is marked, both 
in form and in meaning (Payne 1985, Horn 1989 and others). That is, expressions 
conveying a negation are morphologically or syntactically more complex than their 
positive or affirmative counterparts. And a proposition that does not involve an 
expression ‘flagging’ negation in some way or another will be interpreted as affirmative, 
rather than as negative. This leads de Swart (2004) to posit the constraint *NEG: 
 
(17) *NEG 
Avoid Negation 
 
*NEG is an output oriented constraint, which favors candidates that do not mark negation 
formally, or that do not interpret expressions as negative over others. Thus it qualifies as 
a markedness constraint in OT. *NEG is balanced by two faithfulness constraints, which 
emphasize that information from the input should be reflected in the output. For the OT 
syntax, this is MaxNeg (18), for the OT semantics, this is IntNeg (19): 
  
(18) MAXNEG 
Mark the argument of a negative chain 
 
(19) INTNEG 
Interpret all Neg expressions in the input (form) as contributing a negative  
meaning in the output (meaning) 
 
How can we use these constraints to account for double negation and negative concord? 
We propose that they rely on two different rankings of these constraints. Negative 
concord arises under the ranking MAXNEG >> *NEG >> INTNEG. Double negation 
languages involve the ranking INTNEG >> *NEG >> MAXNEG. This is illustrated by the 
tableaux 4a and 4b for negative concord languages, and tableaux 5a and 5b for double 
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negation languages, which exemplify the bi-directional optimization for a sentence 
involving the binding of two variables: 
 
Tableau 4a (generation of NC) 
 
Meaning Form MAXNEG *NEG INTNEG 
¬∃x1∃x2 neg + indef      *    *  
                        neg + neg    **  
 
Tableau 4b (interpretation of NC) 
 
Form Meaning MAXNEG *NEG INTNEG 
neg + neg ¬∃x1¬∃x2   **  
                        ¬∃x1∃x2    *     * 
 
Tableau 5a (generation of DN) 
 
Meaning Form INTNEG *NEG MAXNEG 
¬∃x1∃x2           neg + indef     *      * 
 neg + neg    **  
 
Tableau 5b (interpretation of DN) 
 
Form Meaning INTNEG *NEG MAXNEG 
neg + neg             ¬∃x1¬∃x2    **  
 ¬∃x1∃x2    *   
 
 
Tableau 4a shows that the combination of two neg expressions is the optimal form for the 
meaning ¬∃x1∃x2. The single negation reading comes out as the optimal meaning of the 
combination of two neg expressions in tableau 4b. Tableau 5a illustrates that double 
negation languages generate indefinites within the scope of negation as the optimal form. 
If we combine two neg expressions anyway, we end up with a double negation reading, 
as illustrated in tableau 5b. Thus the two rankings account for our basic intuitions about 
negative concord and double negation as two ways of bi-directional optimization:2 
 
• Negative Concord: If you mark arguments of a negative chain formally  
(MAXNEG >> *NEG in production), then make sure you do not interpret each Neg 
expression as contributing a semantic negation (*NEG >> INTNEG in interpretation).  
• Double Negation: If you interpret each Neg expression as contributing a semantic 
negation (INTNEG >> *NEG in interpretation), then make sure you do not mark 
arguments of a negative chain formally (*NEG >> MAXNEG in production). 
 
                                                 
2
 Any other potential ranking of the three constraints is shown to be unstable by de Swart (2004). 
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The example of marking and interpretation of negation makes it clear that 
compositionality problems may be motivated by the syntax, and that languages may 
differ in the way they balance out syntax and semantics. A procedure of bi-directional 
optimisation leads to new insights for questions that so clearly concern the interface 
between form and meaning. An important question that arises in this context is the 
question of language acquisition. How do children learn to balance out the syntax and 
semantics of their mother tongue? Section 6 will show that bi-directional optimization is 
not an easy skill to acquire.  
 
6. OT Semantics, bidirectionality and language acquisition 
Smolensky (1996) and Tesar and Smolensky (1998) show that the OT approach also 
sheds new light on questions of language acquisition. They argue that children start out 
with a system in which markedness constraints are ranked above faithfulness constraints. 
This explains why children generally understand much more than they can produce. 
Reranking of constraints is then part and parcel of the acquisition process. Ongoing 
research by Irene Krämer is testing this hypothesis for semantic aspects of acquisition by 
studying the interpretation of quantifiers like many, and the interpretation of indefinites 
and pronouns in the context of a story. Furthermore, de Hoop and Krämer (2004) show 
that bi-directionality also plays a role in language acquisition. It is well known (Lidz and 
Musolino 2002) that there is an asymmetry between the children’s interpretation of 
indefinites in subject and in object position. Indefinite subjects are by default interpreted 
as referential (type e, according to van der Does and de Hoop 1998), whereas indefinite 
objects are by default interpreted as non-referential (type <e,t> according to van der 
Does and de Hoop 1998). The two readings differ in the anaphoric element they may 
combine with. When the object a guy is interpreted non-referentially, it may be followed 
by the indefinite anaphor one in (20). If the same object is interpreted referentially, it may 
be followed by the referential pronoun him in (21): 
(20) Donald saw a guy, and Ronald saw one too.   [non-referential] 
(21) Donald saw a guy, and Ronald saw him too.   [referential] 
The well-formedness of (21) illustrates that referential readings of indefinite objects are 
available in the adult language. Indeed, in Germanic languages, scrambling of the object 
typically brings out the referential interpretation as the only available reading. Compare 
the following contrast: 
 
(21) Je mag twee keer een potje omdraaien.    [Dutch] 
You may two time a pot around-turn. 
‘You may turn around a pot twice.’ 
 
(22) Je mag een potje twee keer omdraaien. 
You may a pot two time around-turn. 
‘You may turn around a pot twice.’ 
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The position of the indefinite een potje to the right of the adverbial in (21) is the default, 
unscrambled position of the object. The position to the left of the adverbial in (22) is the 
scrambled position of the indefinite object. Krämer (2000) confirms that adults usually 
assign the unscrambled object (21) a non-referential reading, whereas the scrambled 
object (22) always gets a referential interpretation. Most children under 7, however, 
interpret the scrambled objects non-referentially as well. Similar observations have been 
made with respect to English, Kannada, and other languages (cf. de Hoop and Krämer 
2004 for references). 
One potential explanation for these findings might be that children have a general 
preference to interpret indefinite noun phrases non-referentially. However, this cannot be 
true, in view of the fact that children are perfectly capable of obtaining a referential 
interpretation for indefinite subjects in sentences like (23): 
 
 (23) Een meisje gleed twee keer uit.  
A girl slipped two times out[particle]. 
‘A girl slipped twice.’ 
 
In sum, children are adult-like in their interpretation of referential indefinite subjects, and 
in their interpretation of non-referential indefinite objects. They differ from adults when 
they have to interpret non-referential indefinite subjects, and when they have to interpret 
referential indefinite objects. The explanation de Hoop and Krämer offer for these 
observations is that the preferred (unmarked) reading for indefinite objects in default (i.e. 
unscrambled) position is the non-referential interpretation, whereas the preferred 
(unmarked) reading for indefinite subjects in default (i.e. Spec-IP) position is the 
referential interpretation. In existential there sentences we find non-referential readings 
of indefinites, but there the subject is in Spec-VP position. Children start out by learning 
to associate unmarked forms and unmarked meanings, and the combination of marked 
forms with marked meanings is not acquired until later. They work this out in a bi-
directional optimality theoretic analysis of the subject-object asymmetry. They use two 
constraints on form, and two constraints on meaning in their analysis: 
 
M1: Subjects outrank objects in referentiality, i.e., subjects get a referential 
interpretation, while objects get a non-referential interpretation. 
M2: Indefinite noun phrases get a non-referential interpretation. 
F1: Indefinite objects do not scramble. 
F2: Subjects are in standard subject position, referred to as [Spec, IP]. 
 
Putting these four constraints together gives the unmarked meanings of indefinite 
subjects and objects from an OT semantic point of view, and the unmarked forms from an 
OT syntactic point of view. For the combination of marked forms and marked meanings, 
de Hoop and Krämer appeal to the bidirectional notion of ‘superoptimality’. According to 
Blutner (2000) a form-meaning pair <f,m> is superoptimal if and only if there is no other 
super-optimal pair <f’,m> such that <f’,m> is more harmonic than <f,m>, and there is no 
other super-optimal pair <f,m’> such that <f,m’> is more harmonic than <f,m>. Both 
unmarked form-meaning pairs <f,m> and marked form-meaning pairs <f’,m’> come out 
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as ‘superoptimal’ in this set-up. This is reflected in the following tableaux, where the 
super-optimal pairs are indicated with the symbol : 
 
Tableau 6 (indefinite objects in bidirectional OT) 
 
 
input: [f,m] indefinite object 
f1: unscrambled; f2: scrambled 
m1: non-referential <e,t>; m2: referential <e> 
M1 M2 F1 
[-scrambling, <e,t>]                                                    
[-scrambling, e]    *    *  
[+scrambling, <e,t>]      * 
[+scrambling, e]                                                          *    *    * 
 
 
Tableau 7 (indefinite subjects in bidirectional OT) 
 
 
input: [f,m] indefinite subject 
f1: standard (Spec-IP); f2: embedded (Spec-VP) 
m1: referential <e>; m2: non-referential <e,t> 
M1 M2 F2 
[Spec-IP, e]                                                                 *  
[Spec-IP, <e,t>]    *      
[Spec-VP, e]    *   * 
[Spec-VP, <e,t>]                                                         *       * 
 
 
Tableau 6 shows that the indefinite object that combines a referential meaning with a 
scrambled word order violates all three relevant constraints. Still, it represents a 
superoptimal pair, for there is no other superoptimal pair available that has either a more 
harmonic form or a more harmonic meaning. Similarly, tableau 7 reflects that one 
superoptimal pair links the unmarked meaning to the unmarked position [Spec-IP, e], 
while the other super-optimal pair links the marked meaning to the marked position 
[Spec-VP, <e,t>]. 
 The bidirectional OT analysis straightforwardly explains the adult pattern of the 
interpretation of both indefinite subjects and objects. Adults are able to evaluate form-
meaning pairs. That means that they cannot only find the optimal form for a certain 
meaning or the optimal meaning of a certain form, they are also capable of determining 
as a superoptimal pair the combination of a form that is sub-optimal from a unidirectional 
syntactic perspective, and a meaning that is sub-optimal from a unidirectional semantic 
perspective. The central claim de Hoop and Krämer are making is that children cannot 
evaluate form-meaning pairs yet. In interpreting indefinites, they optimize 
unidirectionally, and choose the unmarked, i.e. non-referential meaning for the unmarked 
(unscrambled) objects as well as for the marked (scrambled) objects. Similarly, they 
derive the unmarked (referential) reading for subjects in standard and embedded position. 
In order to obtain the right interpretation for the indefinite in a marked position, the child 
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must learn to apply the process of optimization bidirectionally. The child needs to learn 
to reason as follows: I can find the optimal interpretation for this form, but I notice that 
the form is sub-optimal; the speaker would have used the optimal form for the unmarked 
meaning, therefore I must choose the sub-optimal meaning for this sub-optimal form, 
which will give me another (‘marked’) superoptimal form-meaning pair. Before the 
4-year old child will be a competent, adultlike hearer of her language, she must acquire 
the full process of optimization of interpretation, which includes the speaker’s 
perspective of optimization in a bidirectional approach. 
 
7. Moving on… 
 
As we tried to show in this paper, Optimality Theory opens up a new way of thinking 
about semantics, and raises a whole set of new research questions. The examples 
discussed in this paper highlight the interaction of constraints from different domains 
(cross-modularity) in the process of anaphora resolution, the role of context in the 
interpretation of polysemous expressions like round, the need for bi-directional 
optimization in the case of compositionality questions raised by negation, and the role of 
OT semantics and bidirectionality in language acquisition. In all cases, we emphasized 
the need to interpret expressions in context. This can be the sentential context, the 
discourse context, or more broadly, the context of general cognition, involving various 
stages of acquisition. Ongoing research by several members of the project group focuses 
on embedding of the results obtained so far in a more general, cognitive framework. 
Ongoing research by Gerlof Bouma and Petra Hendriks studies the relation between 
syntactic structure (coordination vs. subordination) and discourse structure in the 
resolution of anaphora (pronouns, ellipsis). Helen de Hoop, Joost Zwarts and Henriëtte de 
Swart continue their research on the ranking of semantic and syntax-semantic constraints 
in their study of cross-linguistic variation in meaning. Ongoing research by Irene Krämer 
and Petra Hendriks aims at an integration of learning of language and learning in other 
cognitive domains. For instance, children need to learn to give priority to linguistic and 
discourse information over extra-linguistic (general and contextual) information. If we 
can model these issues in terms of a ranking of violable constraints, we can hopefully 
find new ways of connecting linguistics to other domains of cognitive science. 
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